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The First Amendment and Specialty
License Plates:
The "Choose Life" Controversy
I. INTRODUCTION
Specialty license plate programs, specifically the "Choose Life"
specialty license plate, have been and continue to be the subject of much
controversy. For those in the pro-life community, the stakes are high. In
Florida, as of February 29, 2008, the "Choose Life" specialty license plate
has raised over five and a half million dollars for organizations that help
women who are committed to adoption.1 For those on both sides of the
debate, the "Choose Life" controversy is shaping the way the judicial system
defines government and private speech. Therefore, this controversy has
serious implications for First Amendment rights.
The government speech doctrine, concerning speech by the government
that is not required to be viewpoint neutral, is a fairly recent concept.2 As
cooperation between government and private parties continues to increase,
the distinction between government and private speech becomes even more
important. When demarcation between government and private speech is
unclear, the government argues that a certain message is government speech
1. Choose Life, Inc., About Us, http://www.choose-life.org/story.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2008). Proceeds for Illinois state parks from an environmental spe-
cialty license plate total over seven million dollars, and Massachusetts environmental
plates generate about one million dollars annually for environmental nonprofit groups.
Deborah Olszonowicz, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL Transportation
Reviews: Motor Vehicle Registration and License Plates (Sept. 1999),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/transportation/tranrmp.htm#specialty. Proceeds from
Centennial Commemorative plates totaled approximately one million dollars for a
variety of centennial celebrations in Las Vegas in 2005. Anne Teigan & Nicholas
Farber, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL Transportation Review: Motor
Vehicle Registration and License Plates (July 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/print/trans
portation/license-registration07.pdf.
2. The concept only gained prominence after the decision in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991). In Rust, plaintiffs challenged a regulation barring doctors, who
were subsidized by family planning funds under the Public Health Service Act, from
discussing abortion with patients. Id. at 178-81. The Supreme Court upheld the regu-
lation, holding that when the government itself is the speaker viewpoint-based fund-
ing decisions are allowed. Id. at 194.
1
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because the message is literally printed on government property (e.g., special-
ty license plates) or part of a specific government program (e.g., family
planning under Title X of the Public Health Service Act at issue in Rust).
3
But to some extent, the property itself is simply a vehicle for individuals to
express private speech (such as "Choose Life" supporters wanting to put their
message on specialty license plates), and the program might involve adminis-
tration by private parties (such as the doctors subsidized by family planning
funds in Rust).4 If a specialty license plate is considered government speech,
then viewpoint neutrality is not required. Further, expanding the government
speech doctrine may chill private citizens' free speech rights. Alternatively,
if a specialty license plate is deemed private speech, it may gloss over any
compelling state interest the government has in crafting its own message.
This summary will examine the models of specialty license plate
creation, the history of "Choose Life" specialty license plates, the litigation
surrounding the controversy, and the two differing standards courts have used
to distinguish government and private speech: the Fourth Circuit's four-factor
test and the Johanns test.
In its "four-factor" test, the Fourth Circuit looks to the following factors
to distinguish between government and private speech: (1) the central "pur-
pose" of the program in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree
of "editorial control" exercised by the government or private entities over the
content of the speech; (3) the identity of the "literal speaker;" and (4) whether
the government or the private entity bears the "ultimate responsibility" for the
content of the speech.5 The Sixth Circuit has declined to apply the four-factor
test and instead has applied the test from Johanns - whether "the government
sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated' 6 - to distinguish government from private speech.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit8 and several federal district courts9 have
adopted the four-factor test of the Fourth Circuit instead of the Sixth Circuit's
Johanns test. However, the Sixth Circuit's decision to use the Johanns test
over the four-factor test is evidence that there is a split among the circuits
3. See 500 U.S. 173.
4. Id.
5. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of Va. Dep't of Motor Ve-
hicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002).
6. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
7. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005)).
8. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008).
9. Choose Life of Mo., Inc. v. Vincent, No. 06-0443-CV-W-SOW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6524, at *12 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2008); Children First Found., Inc. v.
Martinez, No. 1:04-CV-0927, 2007 WL 4618524, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2007);
Byrne v. Lunderville, No. 1:05-CV-15, 2007 WL 2892620, at *4 (D. Vt. Sept. 28,
2007); Choose Life I1l., Inc. v. White, No. 04-C-4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *4 (N.D.
111. Jan. 19, 2007).
1280 [Vol. 73
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regarding which test is most appropriate when applied to the controversy
surrounding specialty license plates.
Currently, there is pending litigation in three states,1 while in fifteen
other states pro-life groups are working toward obtaining a "Choose Life"
specialty license plate.l" Moreover, debate continues to surround the issue of
specialty license plates outside of the "Choose Life" controversy.' 2 Since
there is currently a split of authority between the circuits, and because the
United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue five times,'
3
the specialty license plate controversy will only escalate over the coming
years.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Models of Specialty License Plate Creation
There are three models of specialty license plate creation in which
individuals or organizations are able to receive and display their own
specialty license plates. 14 The three models of specialty license plate creation
are the administrative model, the legislative model, and a hybrid model.
1. Administrative Model
In the administrative model of specialty license plate creation, a state
legislature enacts a specialty license plate statute which defines the process
by which organizations may apply for specialty plates and designates an
agency to review such applications. Montana, for example, has a purely
10. Choose Life, Inc., Other States, http://www.choose-life.org/states.htm (last
visited Oct. 23. 2008).
11. Id.
12. See Jessica Gresko, Florida Lawmakers Debate Offering a Christian License
Plate, BREITBART.COM, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php
?id=D9083RK80; Bill Estep, Anti-porn Group Seeks License Plate,
http://www.protect-x.com/news/707/Anti-pom-group-seeks-license-plate.html (last
visited Oct. 23, 2008).
13. See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. de-
nied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008); Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. de-
nied, 128 S. Ct. 884 (2008); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 906 (2006); Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351 (5th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Keeler v. Stalder, 548 U.S. 904 (2006); Planned
Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1119 (2005).
14. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discre-
tion: The Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REv. 419, 424-27 (2001);
Alana C. Hake, Note, The States, a Plate, and the First Amendment: The "Choose
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administrative model of specialty license plate creation. Under the Montana
Generic Specialty License Plate Act,' 5 the Department of Motor Vehicles is
charged with designing the background and general format of the specialty
license plate, determining the most efficient and versatile manufacturing
method of specialty license plates, and plate numbering.' 6 The Department
must also adopt rules specifying the minimum and maximum number of
characters a specialty license plate may contain, the general placement of a
sponsor's name, message, and graphic, and any other limitations on the
choice of color or detail of the graphic. 7 Additionally, the sponsor name,
message, and graphic must be approved by the Department.' A govem-
mental body19 or organization20 may qualify as a sponsor under the Act if the
entity meets certain requirements. Once the specialty plate is created, the
Department of Motor Vehicles must issue a set of generic specialty license
plates to an individual who applies and pays both an administrative fee22 and
"the donation fee established by the plate sponsor."
23
2. Legislative Model
In contrast to the administrative model, the legislative model of
specialty license plate creation involves legislatures enacting statutory
provisions that create individual specialty license plates. A senator or rep-
resentative sponsors a bill detailing who may aply, the design, additional
fees, and any limitations (i.e. on transferability). For example, in 2007 in
Tennessee, two legislators introduced a bill to create a specialty license plate
benefiting the Tennessee Equality Project Foundation, an organization that
promotes education and dialogue on issues related to equality for gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons in Tennessee. 26 Although several
15. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-3-472 to-481.
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-474(1)(a)-(c).
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-474(1)(d).
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-474(2).
19. MONT. CODEANN. § 61-3-476.
20. MONT. CODE. ANN § 61-3-475.
21. Requirements include, but are not limited to: submitting an application, proof
of good standing, designation of one organizational member as specialty plate liaison,
and a proposed donation fee scheme. Id.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-480.
23. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-479.
24. Hake, supra note 14, at 414.
25. See, e.g., S.B. 856, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008), available at
http://www.senate.mo.gov/08info/pdf-bill/perf/SB856.pdf (creating an Armed Forces
Expeditionary Medal license plate in Missouri).
26. "Legislators introduce license plate bill for Tennessee Equality Project
Foundation." Tennessee Equality Project, Legislators Introduce License Plate Bill for
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specialty license plates can be created through the enactment of a single piece
of legislation, Tennessee's statutes make clear that no specialty license plate
may be created without specific legislative authorization. 27 Tennessee has a
purely legislative model of specialty license plate creation. Currently, in
Tennessee the legislature has enacted over sixty-five statutory subsections to
allow the issuance of individual specialty license plates.29
3. Hybrid Model
Finally, some states have instituted a hybrid administrative and
legislative model for specialty license plate creation - such is the case with
Missouri.30 Missouri has two distinct procedures for obtaining a specialty
license plate. 3' First, similar to the legislative model of specialty license plate
creation, the Missouri legislature can pass a bill that creates a specialty
license plate.32 The Missouri legislature has created approximately seventy
license plates through this model, including: "Knights of Columbus," "Har-
mony - Grand Eastern Star," "Prince Hall - Missouri & Jurisdiction - Free &
Accepted Masons," "Shriners Help Kids" and "NAACP" plates.33  The
second procedure reflects the administrative model for specialty plate
creation. Private organizations can apply to the Missouri Department of Rev-
enue, and the department then submits the application to the Joint Committee
on Transportation for approval.34 After committee approval, the Rroposed art
design is submitted, and the plate must be issued within one year.
In Missouri, the two models of specialty plate creation serve as two sep-
arate tracks for an organization to obtain a specialty plate. Nothing limits an
27. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-209 (defining "specialty.. .plate[s]" as those
plates "authorized by statute").
28. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201 to -202, -209.
29. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-232 ("Let's Go Camping"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 55-4-233 ("Alpha Omicron Pi"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-234 ("Driving to a
Cure"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-235 ("Former Prisoners of War").
30. At the outset, it is important to note that Missouri has been operating under a
hybrid model since the statutory scheme for the administrative process was enacted in
2004. Mo. REV. STAT. § 301.3150 (Supp. 2007). However, recent litigation has left
the existence of the administrative track uncertain. See Choose Life of Mo., Inc. v.
Vincent, No. 06-0443-CV-W-SOW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6524 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23,
2008). With an appeal pending in the Eighth Circuit, the future of the administrative
track of specialty plate creation in Missouri remains uncertain. Roach v. Davis, ap-
peal docketed, No. 08-1429 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2008).
31. Choose Life of Mo., Inc. v. Vincent, No. 06-0443-CV-W-SOW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6524, at *3-5 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2008).
32. See, e.g., Mo. S.B. 856 (creating an Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
license plate in Missouri).
33. Choose Life of Mo., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6524, at *4.
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organization from pursuing both tracks simultaneously or choosing to pursue
only one. With a legislative model, an organization would have to find a
member of the General Assembly to sponsor the legislation, seek support
from a majority of the members of the General Assembly, and ensure that the
piece of legislation reaches the decision agenda. An applicant wishing to
seek a specialty plate in Missouri under the administrative model would have
to submit a petition including a list of two hundred potential purchasers and
an application fee to the Department of Revenue, and then seek approval
from the Joint Committee on Transportation Oversight. 36 An organization
might find one of these tracks more feasible than another and therefore may
choose to only pursue one for the purpose of specialty license plate creation.
Florida is another example of a state that has neither a purely legislative
nor purely administrative model of specialty plate creation.3 7 Rather than
having two separate tracks, where organizations can choose either an admin-
istrative track or a legislative track, the model is both administrative and
legislative. 38 Under Florida's original specialty license plate creation statute,
an applicant must submit a petition with signatures of potential purposes, an
application fee, and a marketing strategy plan on forms provided by the
department.39  This information is submitted to the legislature for their
approval.4° If approved, the applicant then must submit a proposed design for
the specialty license plate to the department.4 ' If the legislature does not
approve the application, the application fee is refunded to the organization.
42
B. History of "Choose Life" Specialty License Plates
The "Choose Life" license plate was first made available in Florida, in
1996, when Marion County Commissioner Randy Harris began a grassroots
campaign to obtain the required application fee.4 3 The "Choose Life" license
plate would raise funds and awareness to support women who would commit
to making an adoption plan for their unplanned pregnancies. 44 The Commis-
36. Id.
37. Illinois is another example. After a district court interpreted the specialty
license plate statue in Illinois to allow the Secretary of State to issue specialty license
plates without specific enabling legislation, the legislature (while an appeal of the
district court's interpretation of the statute was pending) amended the statute to re-
quire legislative approval for any new specialty license plate. See Choose Life Ill.,
Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008). As in Florida, the statute in Illinois re-
quires an organization collect signatures and submit an application to the Secretary of
State and then seek legislative approval. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-600(a).





43. Id.; Choose Life, Inc., supra note 1.
44. Choose Life, Inc., supra note 1.
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sioner and other pro-life citizens formed Choose Life, Inc., a pro-life, non-
profit group to help raise funds for the application fee (to defray the cost to
the Department of Motor Vehicles) 45 and gather signatures of potential pur-
chasers.46 In 1998, the Florida General Assembly passed legislation creating
a "Choose Life" plate but the legislation was vetoed by then-Governor Law-
ton Chiles.47 In 1999, the legislation was resubmitted, passed the Florida
General Assembly, and was signed into law by then-Governor Jeb Bush.48
After its success in Florida, Choose Life, Inc., created similar pro-life
specialty plate campaigns in forty-six states.4 9 Currently, the "Choose Life"
specialty license plate is available in nineteen states.50 State law varies as to
whether and how the proceeds generated by the plates might be used, typical-
ly a plan for the proceeds is submitted by the applicant (in an administrative
model) or as part of the legislative act (in a legislative model). Seven states
with "Choose Life" specialty license plates donate a portion of proceeds to
specific pro-life organizations. 51 Thirteen states donate a portion of the
proceeds to organizations that provide adoption assistance and counseling.
52
Eight states prohibit the allocation of such funds to be used by agencies or
organizations that provide abortion services, counseling or referral.53 The
instigation of pro-life specialty plate initiatives in additional states has fueled
the "Choose Life" controversy.
45. FLA. STAT. § 320.08053(l)(c) ("An organization that seeks authorization to
establish a new specialty license plate for which an annual use fee is to be charged
must submit to the department ... [a]n application fee, not to exceed $70,000, to
defray the department's cost for reviewing the application and developing the special-
ty license plate....").
46. Id. Under the first version of Florida's specialty license creation statutory
scheme, organizations were required to show proof of potential purchasers. See 1995
Fla. Laws chs. 95-282, § 1 ("An organization that seeks the authorization to establish
a new specialty license plate for which an annual use fee is to be charged must submit
to the department... [a]n petition, on a form approved by the department, signed by
10,000 or more residents who state their intent to purchase the requested specialty
license plate.").
47. Id.
48. Id.; Olszonowicz, supra note 1.
49. Choose Life, Inc., supra note 1.
50. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See Choose Life, Inc., supra
note 10.
51. GUTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: 'CHOOSE LIFE' LICENSE






Bell: Bell:First Amendment and Specialty License Plates
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
C. Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific
issue of whether specialty license plates constitute government speech or
private speech. However, several United States Supreme Court cases offer
guidance to lower courts, as the Court has addressed a number of issues
which are pertinent to the discussion of specialty license plates.
Rust v. Sullivan was the first case that established the government
speech doctrine, although it did not use the term "government speech., 54 At
issue in this case were regulations promulgated under Title X of the Public
Health Service Act,55 which provided federal funds for family planning
services. The regulations were challenged by doctors and grantees of such
funds as (1) unauthorized by Title X, (2) violative of the First Amendment
rights of Title X clients and providers, and (3) violative of the Fifth Amend-
ment rights of Title X clients. 56 The specific regulations 57 at issue narrowed
the definition of "family planning" to include "preventive family planning
services," effectively excluding counseling related to abortion.58 The Court
reasoned that, "[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way."59 The Court noted that
it "[was] not the case [here] of a general law singling out a disfavored group
on the basis of speech content, but a case of the Government refusing to fund
activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of
the project funded." 0 In effect, the Court in Rust held that the doctor's
actions were government speech.6'
Four years later, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia,62 the United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue of free
speech as it related to government-funded public institutions. In this case, a
Christian student magazine organization and several of the magazine's editors
54. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (2000).
56. Rust, 500 U.S. at 181.
57. Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where
Abortion Is a Method of Family Planning; Standard of Compliance for Family Plan-
ning Services Project, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2925 (Feb. 2, 1988) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 59).
58. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179.
59. Id. at 193.
60. Id. at 194-95 (emphasis added).
61. Although the court in Rust never mentioned the term "government speech,"
the "Court has consistently interpreted Rust on th[e] basis [that the doctors' actions
were government speech]." See Pittsburg League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v.
Port Auth. of Allegheny County, No. 2:06-cv-1064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63370, at
*22 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2008).
62. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
1286 [Vol. 73
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challenged the school's refusal to authorize printing costs on the basis of
religious viewpoint.63 The ma azine and editors claimed such action violated
their First Amendment rights. The Court concluded that by "withholding...
assistance that the University provides generally to all other student
publications, the University has discriminated on the basis of the magazine's
religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause."
65
While the United States Supreme Court frequently addresses free speech
issues, the Court has looked at the controversy surrounding license plates
only once, in Wooley v. Maynard,66 albeit before the "government speech"
doctrine truly came into being. Also, although the Court only examined the
tangential issue of compelled speech, the Court's analysis sheds light on the
relationship between the First Amendment and specialty license plates. In
Wooley, the Court addressed the issue of "whether the State of New Hamp-
shire [could] constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against persons who
cover the motto 'Live Free or Die' on passenger vehicle license plates
because that motto is repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs. The
Court found that the statute criminalizing obstruction of the state motto, "Live
Free or Die" on license plates implicated the First Amendment rights of the
private individuals involved and that the state's espoused interests were not
sufficiently compelling to require the private individuals to display the state
69motto on their license plates. The Court ultimately concluded that "the
State may [not] constitutionally require an individual to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private
property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read
by the public.
70
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist never reached the question of
compelling state interest, as he concluded that the First Amendment rights of
the individuals were not implicated because the display of license plates did
not amount to an "affirmation of belief., 71 Relying on a rationale of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the private
individuals' "'membership in a class of persons required to display plates
bearing the State motto carries no implication and is subject to no require-
63. Id. at 827.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 852.
66. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
67. Id. at 706-07.
68. The state suggested it had two interests in requiring individuals to display the
motto, first that it "facilitat[ed] the identification of passenger vehicles" and second,
that it "promote[d] appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride." Id at 715-
16.
69. Id. at 716-17.
70. Id. at 713.
71. Id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2008] 1287
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ment that they endorse that motto or profess to adopt it as matter of belief.' 72
Based on the reasoning that the state had not forced the private individuals to
actually "say" anything, Justice Rehnquist would have reversed the decision
of the lower court, allowing the state to prosecute the private individuals for
obscuring the state motto on their license plates. 73
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,74 the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's determination that an amendment to the National
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965 discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint and was therefore impermissible under the First Amend-
ment.75 In this case, four individual performance artists applied for grants
before the amendment was enacted.76 Initially, an advisory panel had rec-
ommended approval of their grant applications, but ultimately the artists'
applications were denied by the National Council on the Arts, and the NEA
Chairperson. 77 The challenged amendment "directs the [NEA] Chairperson,
in establishing procedures to judge the artistic merit of grant applications, to
'tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public."' 78 In their complaint, the
individuals claimed violation of their First Amendment rights, failure to
follow statutory procedure, and violation of the Privacy Act of 1974.79 The
four artist plaintiffs were later joined by the National Association of Artists'
Organizations and additionally challenged the amendment as void for vague-
ness and viewpoint-based discrimination under the First Amendment. 80 The
Supreme Court relied heavily on Rust8 ' in holding that the amendment simply
"adds some imprecise considerations to an already subjective selection
process... [and] does not... impermissibly infringe on First... Amend-
ment rights.",
82
In the Supreme Court's most recent decision addressing the issue of
government subsidies and private speakers, United States v. American
Library Ass 'n,83 the Court again upheld conditions placed on public funds. In
this case, a group of libraries, library associations, patrons and web site pub-
lishers challenged the constitutionality of the filtering provision under the
84Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA). After learning that adults were
72. Id. at 721-22 (quoting State v. Hoskin, 295 A.2d 454, 457 (N.H. 1972)).
73. Id. at 720, 722.
74. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
75. Id. at 572-73.
76. Id. at 577.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 576 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 577-78.
81. Id. at 588.
82. Id. at 590.
83. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
84. Id. at 201-02.
1288 [Vol. 73
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using public library computers (which were provided with the use of federal
funds) to access pornography that ultimately resulted in exposure of porno-
graphic images to other library patrons, including children, Congress took
action by passing the CIPA.85  Under this new law, the receipt of federal
funds was conditioned on a library's policy of internet safety for minors.
86
The Court relied, in part, on Finley, holding that "[j]ust as forum analysis and
heightened judicial scrutiny are incompatible with ... the role of the NEA,
they are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must have
to fulfill their traditional missions." 87 The Supreme Court held, under the
standard first articulated in Rust, that Congress could reasonably impose this
limitation on its internet assistance programs and such limitation was not in
violation of the First Amendment.
88
While the Supreme Court continues to shed light on the scope and
application of the government speech doctrine, the doctrine is still in "the
formative stages.,, 89 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari five times on
the issue of specialty license plates; without a clear standard in the specialty
license plate arena, a circuit split has developed in federal circuits as to the
appropriate test for distinguishing government and private speech.
D. Lower Court Approaches to Specialty License Plates
1. The Fourth Circuit's Four-Factor Test
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit to apply a four-factor test to spe-
cialty license plates. In Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter "SCV"), the Sons of
Confederate Veterans appealed to the Fourth Circuit after denial of their
application for a specialty plate displaying their logo (incorporating the
confederate flag). 90 The Sons of Confederate Veterans challenged Virginia's
statutory scheme for specialty license plate creation on the grounds that it
violated the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit noted that "[n]o clear
standard has yet been enunciated in [this] circuit or by the Supreme Court for
determining when the government is 'speaking' and thus able to draw view-
point-based distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech and thus
unable to do so."
91
85. Id. at 199-201.
86. Id. at 201.
87. Id. at 205.
88. Id. at 212, 214.
89. See Pittsburg League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth. of Alleghe-
ny County, No. 2:06-cv-1064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63370, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
14, 2008).
90. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Com'r of Va. Dep't of Motor Ve-
hicles, 288 F.3d 610, 613-14 (4th Cir. 2002).
91. Id. at 618.
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Without a clear standard to follow in specialty license plate cases, the
Fourth Circuit employed a four-factor test utilized by other circuits92 in other
contexts to distinguish between government and private speech.93 Although
the court noted that the four factors are neither "exhaustive [n]or always-
applicable, 94 it concluded the following four-factor test resolved the
government speech issue:
(1) the central "purpose" of the program in which the speech in
question occurs; (2) the degree of "editorial control" exercised by
the government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3)
the identity of the "literal speaker;" and (4) whether the government
or the private entit bears the "ultimate responsibility" for the con-
tent of the speech.95
In applying these factors to the Sons of Confederate Veterans specialty
plate case, the court found that all four factors weighed in favor of private
speech.96 Because government must be viewpoint neutral when regulating
private speech, the court found that the logo restriction could not survive
strict scrutiny and therefore affirmed the district court's determination that the
restriction was unconstitutional.97
In Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose,98 the Fourth
Circuit faced a challenge similar to SCV. In Rose, a pro-choice group argued
that the South Carolina statute authorizing a pro-life license plate amounted
to viewpoint discrimination. 99  In reaching its decision, the court relied
heavily on SCV and employed its four-factor test.
00
Unlike in SCV,1°1 the court in Rose found that the purpose of the statute
was to "promote the State's preference for the pro-life position" and therefore
weighed in favor of a finding of government speech.' 2 Likewise, the Rose
court found that the second factor also weighed in favor of government
speech because the idea for the plate originated with the government, and the
legislature determined the message. 10 3 However, as in SCV, the court found
92. Id. at 618-19 (citing Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132,
1141 (10th Cir. 2001); Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003,
1011 (9th Cir. 2000); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo.,
203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 619.
95. Id. at 618-19.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 619-22, 626, 629.
98. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
99. Id. at 787-88.
100. Id. at 792-93.
101. The court in SCV found that the purpose of the challenged provision was to
"produce revenue" while at the same time allowing for "private expression." Id. at
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that the last two factors, literal speaker and ultimate responsibility, cut in
favor of private speech.1 4 In Rose, the four-factor test was indeterminate.10 5
Without any clear answer from the four-factor test, the court concluded that
the speech was a mixture of private and government speech 10 6 and that the
state engaged in viewpoint discrimination by authorizing the pro-life license
plate.
2. The Sixth Circuit and the Johanns Test
In American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Bredesen,10 7 the Sixth
Circuit declined to apply the Fourth Circuit's four-factor test, announcing that
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass 'n10 8 established a new test for determin-
ing whether speech was government speech. In Bredesen, the Sixth Circuit,
relying on Johanns, upheld the state's decision to issue "Choose Life" license109
plates. In Johanns, the United States Supreme Court was presented with a
challenge to the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985. Under the act,
more than a billion dollars was collected through an assessment on sales or
importation of cattle and beef products and spent on the "Beef. It's What's
for Dinner" promotional campaign."0 The Court held that "[w]hen ... the
government sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every
word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-
speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources in developing specific messages."' I
In American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Bredesen, the ACLU
challenged an act authorizing the issuance of a "Choose Life" specialty
license plate in a state with the purely legislative model of specialty license
plate creation. In denying the ACLU's claim, the Sixth Circuit found there
was no requirement for viewpoint neutrality when a government-crafted mes-
sage is disseminated by private volunteers, as is the case with state-produced
specialty license plates.' 2 The court reasoned that "Johanns require[d] the
court to conclude that 'Choose Life' is Tennessee's message because the Act
determines the overarching message and Tennessee approves every word on
104. Id. at 793-94.
105. Id. at 794.
106. Id.
107. 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
108. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
109. Two other courts have also "upheld" the state's decision to issue plates by
dismissing challenges for procedural reasons. Women's Emergency Network v.
Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (1lth Cir. 2003); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.
2002).
110. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553-54.
111. Id. at 562.
112. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375.
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such plates." 113  The Sixth Circuit noted that even though the private
organization has partial responsibility for the design of the plate, the speech is
government speech under Johanns because the state can veto the license plate
design." 14 The participation of the private organization in license plate design
"has little or no relevance to whether a plate expresses a government
message."' 15 Unlike when a court applies the Fourth Circuit's four-factor
test, the court in Bredesen gave no weight to the fact that Tennessee produces
more than one hundred plates supporting a variety of organizations or to the
fact that the government does not credit itself as the literal speaker."
16
In Bredesen, using a negative inference from the Supreme Court's
decision in Wooley to support its position that no forum for specialty license
plates had been created, the Sixth Circuit stated: "The evil in Wooley was that
the automobile owners were compelled to disseminate the message; here
automobile owners are not only not compelled, they have to pay extra to
disseminate the message." 117 The Bresden court found the Fourth Circuit's
four-factor test to be inapplicable in the instant case for two reasons."' First,
the four-factor test was applied pre-Johanns and has led to indeterminate
results; by contrast, Johanns establishes an "authoritative test" that classifies
specialty license plates as a form of government speech."l 9 Second, the
Fourth Circuit has not addressed how the four-factor test would weigh on
government-provided, privately disseminated speech (e.g. the government
distributing "Register and Vote" pins, "Win the War" postage stamps, and
"Spay or Neuter your Pets" license plates). 12° For these reasons, the Sixth
Circuit declined to adopt the Fourth Circuit's four-factor test.
12
Although the government speech doctrine is still in "the formative
stages,"'122 federal circuit courts and lower district courts have increasingly
been called upon to make the determination between government and private
speech.123 In making this determination, these courts are forced to choose
between two separate analytical methods - the Fourth Circuit's four-factor
test and the Sixth Circuit's application of Johanns.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 377.
116. Id. at 376.
117. Id. at 378.
118. Id. at 380.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 379-80.
121. Id. at 380.
122. See Pittsburg League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth. of Alleghe-
ny County, No. 2:06-cv-1064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63370, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
14, 2008).
123. See Roach v. Davis, appeal docketed, No. 08-1429 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2008);
Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008); Pittsburg League of
Young Voters Educ. Fund, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63370; WV Ass'n of Club Owners
& Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433 (S.D. W. Va. 2007).
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Since Bredesen came down from the Sixth Circuit in 2006, the
Seventh, 12 Ninth 2 ' and Tenth126 Circuits have addressed the "Choose Life"
controversy, as have several district courts.
2 7
A. Developments in 2007: The Tenth Circuit and New York
In 2007, the Tenth Circuit did not address the issue of "Choose Life"
specialty plates on a First Amendment challenge but rather on a jurisdictional
challenge relating to the Tax Injunction Act ("TIA"). 128 The court held that
Okalahoma's specialty license plate charges are "taxes under State law" for
the purpose of the TIA and, therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal
on jurisdictional grounds, and remanded for consideration of other claims. 129
In Children First Foundation, Inc. v. Martinez, the Northern District of
New York denied the defendant's motion to amend her answer to include the
defense of government speech, among other defenses.' 30 Although the court
declined to decide the question of whether the specialty license plate program
at issue "involve[d] purely government or private speech," the court found
that the defendant's government speech defense was not without merit.
131
124. Choose Life ofIll. Inc., 547 F.3d 853.
125. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 56 (2008).
126. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit has also
preliminarily examined the issue, remanding the case back to the District Court for a
decision on Motion to Dismiss of Defendant (New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commis-
sion, et al.). Children First Found., Inc. v. Legreide, 259 F. App'x 444 (3d Cir. 2007).
127. Choose Life of Mo., Inc. v. Vincent, No. 06-0443-CV-W-SOW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6524, at *12 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2008); Children First Found., Inc. v.
Martinez, No. 1:04-CV-0927, 2007 WL 4618524, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2007);
Byrne v. Lunderville, No. 1:05-CV-15, 2007 WL 2892620, at *4 (D. Vt. Sept. 28,
2007); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04-C-4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 19, 2007).
128. Hill, 478 F.3d at 1243-44. The Tax Injunction Act limits the jurisdiction of
federal district courts, barring them from "enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing]
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(2000). For a more detailed discussion of the Tax Injunction Act in relation to spe-
cialty license plates, see Traci Daffer, Comment, A License to Choose or a Plate-ful
of Controversy? Analysis of the "Choose Life" Plate Debate, 75 UMKC L. REv. 869,
884-85 (2007).
129. Hill, 478 F.3d at 1262.
130. No. 1:04-CV-0927, 2007 WL 4618524, at *1 (N.D.N.Y Dec. 27, 2007).
131. Id. at *8.
2008] 1293
15
Bell: Bell:First Amendment and Specialty License Plates
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Thus, the court allowed the defendant to amend her answer with a govern-
ment speech doctrine affirmative defense.'
32
B. Developments in 2008: The Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and
Missouri
Three specialty license plate cases were decided on the merits in
2008.133 In Arizona Life Coalition Inc. v. Stanton, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Arizona
License Plate Commission.' 34 The plaintiff alleged the Commission violated
its First Amendment right to free speech by arbitrarily denying its application
for a "Choose Life" plate.' 35 While noting the circuit split in the test between
private and government speech, the Ninth Circuit found the Bredesen dissent
persuasive, noting that Johanns is factually distinct from the case before them
but also finding it "instructive when determining whether the message consti-
tutes government or private speech.' ' 136 Thus, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Fourth Circuit's four-factor test.
137
The Ninth Circuit held that the first factor, the "central purpose" factor,
weighed toward private speech, finding that the central purpose of the
specialty license plate program was "revenue raising."' 38 The court also
found that the second factor weighed in favor of private speech because it
determined the Commission only had "de minimis editorial control over the
plate design and color."'139 Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision
in Wooley, the court concluded that, although the identity of the literal speak-
er has characteristics of both private and government speech, "where Life
Coalition's logo ... will also be displayed on the license plate supporting the
message 'Choose Life,"' it is primarily private speech. 14 With respect to the
fourth factor, the court found that Life Coalition bears the ultimate
responsibility for the speech, because an organization that wants "to convey a
certain message . . . must take the affirmative step of submitting an
application."' 4 After finding that all four factors weighed in favor of private
speech, the court concluded that Arizona had created a "limited public
132. Id. at *12.
133. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008); Ariz. Life Coal.
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008);
Choose Life of Mo., Inc. v. Vincent, No. 06-0443-CV-W-SOW, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6524 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2008).
134. 515 F.3d at 960.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 964-65.
137. Id. at 965.
138. Id. at 966.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 967.
141. Id. at 968.
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forum.' 42 Because the Commission denied Coalition's application on the
basis of the viewpoint of the proposed message, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Commission violated the First Amendment. 1
In Illinois, after several bills were introduced to create a "Choose Life"
plate and the General Assembly took no action, a pro-life group brought a suit
alleging that the state's denial of a "Choose Life" license plate amounted to
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. 144 The North-
em District of Illinois employed the Fourth Circuit's four-factor test145 and
ultimately granted the pro-life group's motion for summary judgment. 46 On
appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Secretary of State argued that specialty
license plate speech is government speech.147 While the Seventh Circuit
"acknowledge[d] the question [of whether specialty license plates are private
or government speech] has divided other circuits," the court rejected the Sec-
retary of State's argument.1
48
At the time when the pro-life group first sought their specialty license
plate, Illinois seemed to have a purely legislative model. After the district
court determined that the Secretary of State could issue specialty license
plates without specific enabling legislation (suggesting that Illinois had a
hybrid form of specialty plate creation), the Illinois legislature (while the
appeal to the Seventh Circuit was pending) amended the statute to require
legislative approval for new specialty license plates.
In White, the Seventh Circuit examined the application of the four-factor
test by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, and the application of Johanns by the
Sixth Circuit. 149 The Seventh Circuit noted that the "Sixth Circuit [is] alone
in holding that specialty license plates implicate no private-speech rights at
all" and found the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' analytical approaches more
persuasive. 50 The Seventh Circuit stated that the Fourth Circuit's four-factor
test could be "distilled" by focusing on a single inquiry: "Under all the cir-
cumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be the gov-
ernment or a private party?"'151 The court concluded that specialty license
plates were not government speech and were instead, "'mobile billboards' for
the organizations and like-minded vehicle owners to promote their causes.
142. Id. at 971.
143. Id. at 973. A petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court on
October 6, 2008. Stanton v. Ariz. Life Coal., 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008).
144. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04-C-4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *1-3
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007).
145. Id. at *4.
146. Id. at *9.
147. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2008).
148. Id. at 855.
149. Id. at 859-64.
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Despite this conclusion, the court conceded that "[t]he State can reasonably
be viewed as having approved the message; it is commonly understood that
specialty license plates require State authorization."' 53 In concluding that the
speech on specialty license plates implicated private, first-amendment, speech
rights, the Seventh Circuit proceeded with forum analysis. Finding that spe-
cialty license plates were a nonpublic forum, and that rejection of the
"Choose Life" specialty license plate was both viewpoint neutral and reason-
able, the Seventh Circuit held that there was no First Amendment violation.
Therefore, no "Choose Life" plate is currently available to individuals in Illi-
nois.
Unlike in Illinois, the future of "Choose Life" license plates in Missouri
is still uncertain. Although "Choose Life" plates are currently available, the
decision of the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri has
been appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and, therefore, whether Missouri citizens
will be able to display the "Choose Life" plates indefinitely is uncertain.154
Missouri offers nearly two hundred different license plate designs in the
categories of organizational, collegiate, and military. Some specialty
license plates, including organization names and logos, require payment of an
additional fee to the sponsoring organization. 15  An application for a
"Choose Life" specialty license plate was submitted to the Department of
Revenue on June 30, 2005 and was subsequently denied on February 21,
2006.157 An appeal was also denied,158 and litigation ensued.
159
In Choose Life of Missouri, Inc. v. Vincent, plaintiffs Choose Life of
Missouri challenged the denial of their application for a "Choose Life" plate
through the administrative model of specialty plate creation in Missouri. 6° In
reviewing their motion for summary judgment, the Federal District Court for
the Western District of Missouri first turned to the issue of whether specialty
license plates constitute government or private speech.16' The court noted
that "no clear standard [has been] enunciated in [the Eighth] circuit or by the
Supreme Court for determining when the government is 'speaking for
153. Id. at 864.
154. Roach v. Davis, appeal docketed, No. 08-1429 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2008).
155. Mo. Dep't of Revenue, Personalized and Specialty License Plates,
http://dor.mo.gov/mvdl/motorv/plates/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
156. Id.
157. Choose Life of Mo. Homepage, http://www.chooselifeniissouri.org/401.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
158. Id.
159. Choose Life of Mo., Inc. v. Vincent, No. 06-0443-CV-W-SOW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6524 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2008).
160. Id. at *3-8; see also Women's Res. Network v. Gourley, 305 F. Supp. 2d
1145, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (striking down a specialty license plate provision be-
cause it "'vest[ed] unbridled discretion in [an official or agency] over whether to
permit or deny expressive activity"' (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988)).
161. Choose Life of Mo., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6524, at *9.
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itself... and when the government is regulating private speech.' ' 162 In relying
on SCV, the court adopted the Fourth Circuit's four-factor test, without offer-
ing an explanation why Johanns (or Bredesen) was not the appropriate
standard.'
In applying the four-factor test, the Federal District Court for the West-
ern District of Missouri found that the specialty license plate program serves
dual purposes - government identification and facilitating requests of private
organizations to by-pass the legislature.164 Therefore, the court found that the
first factor weighed in favor of both government and private speech.
165
Because the court found that neither the Department of Revenue nor the Joint
Committee on Transportation exercised editorial control over the content of
the specialty license plates, the second factor weighed in favor of a finding of
private speech. 166 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri analyzed the third and fourth factors together, finding they weighed
in favor of private speech. 67 The court found that the private citizen is the
literal speaker, relying on the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit that "'no one
who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with the phrase 'Choose Life'
would doubt that the owner of that vehicle holds a pro-life viewpoint."
' 168
The court found that the private organization and private individual bear the
ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech because the organization
crafts the message and the individual chooses to purchase the specialty
license plate. 1
69
On February 7, 2008, Representative Neal St. Onge introduced a bill in
the Missouri House of Representatives that would repeal the statutory
sections struck down in Choose Life of Missouri, Inc. and require
organizations to instead seek approval of their specialty plates from the
General Assembly.' 70 This legislative effort proved unsuccessful in the 2008
legislative session, but similar efforts may arise in the future. If similar legis-
lation is enacted, Missouri would remain a hybrid model of specialty plate
creation, as it would maintain the purely legislative model and a form of the
162. Id. at *11.
163. Id. at *11-12, 14.
164. Id. at *14.
165. Id. at *14-15.
166. Id. at *15-16.
167. Id. at *16.
168. Id. at *16-17 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d
786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004)).
169. Id. at *17.
170. H.B. 2037, 94th Gen. Assem. 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008), available at
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills08l/bills/HB2037.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2008); KSPR News, Mo. Lawmakers Seek More Power over Issuing License




Bell: Bell:First Amendment and Specialty License Plates
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
administrative model.1 71 The proposed legislation would not affect the legis-
lative model of specialty plate creation in Missouri. The legislation would
also create an "administrative model" where those seeking administrative
approval would have to first seek approval of the entire General Assembly
and then submit an application and fee to the Department of Revenue.'
Regardless of the possibility of future legislative changes to Missouri's
specialty license plate statutory scheme, the continued availability of the




The fact that federal circuits have disagreed on which test is most
appropriate to distinguish government and private speech is not surprising;
the application of either test raises concerns. Specifically, when applied to
different models of specialty plate creation, each test reaches different results
in determining whether speech is private or governmental. This is especially
troublesome for states that have hybrid systems of specialty plate creation;
because under either of these tests, the specialty plate that went through the
administrative model of specialty plate creation is likely to be private speech
while the specialty plate that went through the legislative model of specialty
plate creation is likely to be government speech. This leads to the bizarre
result of specialty plates within the same state being two different kinds of
speech, which are afforded two different types of protection. Government
speech is not required to be viewpoint neutral. Private speech is analyzed
under forum analysis, while the court's level of scrutiny is based on the type
of forum. Generally, the regulation of private speech must be viewpoint
neutral. Courts, particularly those in states with hybrid models of specialty
plate creation, should reconsider the Sixth and Fourth Circuits' tests.
A. Reconsidering the Johanns Test
In applying the Johanns test in Bresden, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
the speech at issue was government speech. The only factor considered in the
Johanns test is that of editorial control. In Bredesen, because the specialty
plate went through the Tennessee legislature, and the legislature had control
171. Mo. H.B. 2037.
172. Id. ("1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no organiza-
tion shall seek authorization from the department of revenue to establish a new spe-
cialty license plate until the license plate proposal has been approved by the general
assembly during its regular legislative session. 2. After receiving approval of the
general assembly as required under subsection 1 of this section, the organization seek-
ing authorization to establish a new specialty license plate shall submit to the depart-
ment of revenue the [required applications and fees] .... ").
173. Roach v. Davis, appeal docketed, No. 08-1429 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2008).
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over the message, the Johanns test classified it as government speech. It is
quite clear, however, that if the Johanns test were to be applied in a case with
a purely administrative model (e.g. Montana) the outcome would be exactly
the opposite. In Montana, a private organization controls the content of the
message, and the administrative agency only ensures that the organization
meets specific requirements. Because the government does not have
complete editorial control over the message, under Johanns, a "Choose Life"
plate would be private speech.
This makes clear that one major concern with the Johanns test is that it
fails to address the problem of attribution, a concern in many compelled
speech cases.'74 Several courts have reasoned that specialty license plates are
private speech on the ground that the public attributes the message displayed
to the private individual owner of the car. The Johanns test not only fails to
address the issue of attribution but also fails to explain why the factor should
not weigh on the distinction between private and government speech.
B. Reconsidering the Fourth Circuit's Test
The outcomes in SCV and Rose demonstrate the weakness of the Fourth
Circuit's four-factor test. In SCV, the license plate at issue went through an
administrative model of specialty plate creation, and the court found all of the
factors weighed in favor of private speech. In Rose, where the plate went
through a legislative specialty plate creation model, the court found the four
factors to be indeterminate - the first two weighing in favor of government
speech, 75 and the last two weighing in favor of private speech.
In Rose, the court used the fact that third parties who see a specialty
license plate come to the conclusion that the owner of that vehicle has a "pro-
life" view point to determine that the private individual is the literal speaker
and bears ultimate responsibility for the message.176  Using third-party
perception as a factor in determining private or government speech further
complicates the analysis, especially in states with hybrid models of specialty
license plate creation. How is an ordinary citizen supposed to distinguish
between specialty plates adopted through the legislative model (as were the
"NAACP"'177 and "Friends of Kids with Cancer"'178 plates in Missouri) that
are government speech and the specialty license plates adopted through the
174. See supra Part II.C; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When
Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 605 (2008).
175. See the preceding discussion of the Johanns test that makes clear that the
second factor of the Fourth Circuit's test "editorial control" weighs differently under
different models of specialty plate creation.
176. Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004).
177. Choose Life of Mo., Inc. v. Vincent, No. 06-0443-CV-W-SOW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6524, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2008).
178. S.B. 1233, 92d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004), available at
http://www.senate.mo.gov/041NFO/bills/SB 1233.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
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administrative model (as were the "Understand Autism"'79 and the "Show Me
Beef" 80 plates in Missouri) that are private speech? In light of the fact that
Missouri has approximately two hundred specialty plates, it would be
extremely difficult for private citizens to determine which plates speak for the
government and which plates simply express the views of the owner of the
vehicle. For this reason, the tests should be reconsidered, so that it is clearer
to all citizens when the government is speaking and when it is not.
C. Toward a New Test
In addressing the controversy surrounding the creation of specialty
plates, several solutions have been proffered, including: intervention by the
Supreme Court, creating pro-choice license plates, amending states' specialty
license plate creation Processes, and discontinuation of specialty license plate
programs altogether. While creating pro-choice license plates and amend-
ing states' special license plate creation processes may offer relief to
individuals and organizations seeking (or seeking to block) the issuance of
specialty plates, these solutions will not address the question of which test is
appropriate, or how an existing test should be clarified, to better determine
whether something is government or private speech. The test distinguishing
government speech from private speech has significant constitutional law
implications beyond the arena of specialty license plate creation.'
82
Some commentators have suggested that the Cornelius test is more
appropriate in the context of specialty license plates. 8 3 The Cornelius test
focuses on governmental intent in forum creation through three factors: "the
government's policy regarding the property, its practice with respect to the
property, and the compatibility of the property's objective nature with
expressive activity."'18 4 Because the first factor weighs in different directions
when applied to different models of specialty plate creation, the Cornelius
test creates the same bizarre results as the tests of the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits. In a legislative model, the factor weighs against a finding of forum
creation in that "[a] state demonstrates [an] intent to structure the specialty
179. Choose Life of Mo., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6524, at *7.
180. Id.
181. Daffer, supra note 128, at 889-95.
182. See Pittsburg League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth. of Alleghe-
ny County, No. 2:06-cv-1064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63370 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14,
2008) (applying the Fourth Circuit's four-factor test to determine whether the adver-
tising space maintained by a port authority (a state government agency) was govern-
ment or private speech); WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Mu-
sgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) (applying the Fourth Circuit's
four-factor test to determine whether limited video lottery advertising, as authorized
by the Limited Video Lottery Act, is government speech or private speech).
183. Hake, supra note 14, at 439-40.
184. Id. at 448.
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plate scheme to financially support organizations viewed as beneficial to the
community."' 8 5 In an administrative model, the Cornelius factor weighs in
favor of a finding of forum creation, as the state "declares its purpose to allow
members of the public to use specialty plates to promote their own causes....
[It] is an invitation for public expression."' 86 As is the case with the Fourth
and Sixth Circuits' tests, the factors cut differently when applied to different
models of specialty plate creation. 187 Thus, application of the Cornelius
factors proves no more useful than the tests already set out by the Fourth and
the Sixth Circuits.
In addition, some have argued for an extension of the government
speech doctrine. 88 The argument, in effect, is that "[w]here an affiliation
resembles a partnership, so that the public will perceive government approval
of a sponsor's message [as is the case with specialty license plates], govern-
ment should retain control over selection and the government speech analysis
should apply."'189 While many would argue that extending the government
speech doctrine naturally takes away from First Amendment rights, its
supporters argue exactly the opposite: allowing the government more control
over messages in public-private partnerships will "enhance First Amendment
values by increasing opportunities for speech activity."' 190  Although
plausible, an expansion of the government speech doctrine does not seem
very likely because the government speech doctrine is fairly new and the
Supreme Court has already denied certiorari five times on the issue of
specialty license plates. Therefore, this argument fails to address the issue of
specialty license plates in the short term.
Various other factors have been offered up as possibilities to add or
replace factors in the current tests, including: who funds the speech, what is
the program's speech goal, and to whom would a reasonable audience
attribute the speech. 191 If the test for distinguishing between private and
governmental speech focused on attribution rather than on "editorial control,"
there would no longer be an issue of different outcomes when applied to
different models of specialty plate creation. If the court were to determine
that a reasonable audience attributes the message on a specialty license plate
to the individual owner of the car (regardless of whether it came to being
under a legislative model or administrative model) then deeming the message
"private speech" becomes much easier, and the concern that the government
would be forced to enter unwanted debates dissipates. A test which includes
185. Id. at 450-51.
186. Id. at 451.
187. Id. at 450-55.
188. Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement
Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71
(2004).
189. Id. at 74-75.
190. Id. at 138-39.
191. See Corbin, supra note 174.
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the attribution factor and weighs it more heavily would be a step in the right
direction in the controversy surrounding specialty license plates.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent decisions have continued to adopt either the Fourth Circuit's
four-factor test or the Johanns analysis, with most courts applying the four-
factor test. While the government has an interest in protecting messages
printed on its own property and with its own funds, this interest must be ba-
lanced against one of the most fundamental First Amendment rights - a
private individual's right to freedom of speech. Both the four-factor test and
the Johanns test are alarming in that they reach different results under differ-
ent models of specialty license plate creation. A clear cut test would certainly
mean more efficiency, particularly in light of all the recent litigation;
however, a simpler test might also fail to account for the complexity of the
issue and inadequately balance governmental interests with the right to free
speech.
The results of labeling all specialty license plates government speech
might lead to more viewpoint discrimination, but labeling all specialty license
plates private speech would force the government to enter public debates
(which it might prefer to avoid) and disallow the government control over
messages which may be attributed to it. As a result of recent litigation, some
states considered banning specialty license plates all together. Even this
option, however, is unfortunate as many specialty license plates have been
particularly useful in funding causes which serve a public interest. It is
certain that the existing tests to determine whether speech on specialty license
plates is private or governmental speech are not adequate in addressing the
controversy surrounding specialty license plates. Until the Supreme Court
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